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Barnette and Johnson: A Tale of Two
Opinions
Lackland H. Bloom Jr.*
I don't believe in the long opinions which have been almost the rule here.
I think that to state the case shortly and the ground of decision as concisely
and delicately as you can is the real wczy.
Oliver Wendell Holmes'
Among other things, the final two years of the 1980s could well be
remembered as a period of patriotic symbols, especially in the area of
American constitutional law. During the summer of 1988, debate in the
presidential campaign turned to the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag.
George Bush criticized Michael Dukakis for vetoing a Massachusetts bill
that would have required public school teachers to lead their students in
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. 2 Dukakis defended his action by citing an
advisory opinion he had requested from the Supreme Court of Massachusetts which concluded that the bill violated the first amendment. 3 Although
Dukakis's position may have been constitutionally correct, there is no
4
question that Bush's position was more appealing to the voting public.
The controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance seemed relatively tame
compared to the storm of outrage that greeted the Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. Texas 5 the following year. In Johnson, the Court
invalidated a criminal conviction under a Texas statute that prohibited the
"intentional[] ... desecrat[ion of a] ...national flag.., in a way that the
actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe...
his actions." '6 By a five to four vote, the Court held that the conviction
violated Johnson's first amendment freedom of expression. 7 Public reaction
was swift and vigorous. 8 The debate quickly focused on whether the
*Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A. 1970, Southern Methodist University; J.D. 1973, University of Michigan.
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Nina Gray (Mar. 2, 1903), excerpted in S.
Novick, HonorableJustice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes 256 (1989). Arguably, Holmes
revolutionized the way Supreme Court opinions were written. During his tenure on the Court,
his style was "an art form peculiar to [himself]." Id. As a principal spokesman for the Court for
20, years, however, his technique undoubtedly influenced the writing styles of subsequent

Justices.
2. See Toner, Dukakis Invokes Patriotic Theme, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1988, § 1, at 30, col.
1; Greenhouse, Patriotism and the Pledge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 4;
Rosenthal, Bush Weak on Law, Dukakis Asserts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
3. Opinions of theJustices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 879-80, 363 N.E.2d 251, 255
(1977).
4. See Waving the Bloody Shirt, Newsweek, Nov. 21, 1988, at 116-17 (noting that flag
issue, as centerpiece of campaign, was instrumental in propelling Bush to presidency).
5. 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989).
6. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
7. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
8. See Toner, Bush and Many in Congress Denounce Flag Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 23,

4i7
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decision could be overruled by statute or whether a constitutional amendment would be necessary. 9 Shortly after the decision, President Bush
proposed a constitutional amendment that would provide Congress and the
states with the power to prohibit desecration of the American flag.10
Congress instead chose to pass a statute entitled the Flag Protection Act of
1989,11 which it concluded was constitutionally consistent with the Johnson

1989, at A8, col. 3.
9. See id.; Toner, Constitutional Change to Prohibit Flag Burning Introduced in House,
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1989, at A12, col. 1; Toner, President to Seek Amendment to Bar
Burning the Flag, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Weinraub, Bush Seeking Way to
Circumvent Court's Decision on Flag Burning, N.Y. Times,June 27, 1989, at Al, col. 1; see also
Tribe, Protect it-and Ideas, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, § 1, at 19, col. 1 (supporting change
of federal statute outlawing flag desecration rather than amendment to Constitution). For
testimony by Professor Walter Dellinger, opposing a constitutional amendment, and Judge
Robert H. Bork, supporting a constitutional amendment, provided to the House of Representatives during consideration of the flag-burning act, see Statutory and Constitutional
Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 55-63, 203-11 (1989) (statements of Dellinger, Duke University Law School,
and Bork, former judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit),
excerpted in Legal Times, July 24, 1989, at 17.
10. See Toner, Constitutional Change to Prohibit Flag Burning Introduced in House, N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1989, at A 12, col. 1.The proposed amendment favored by the President read:
"The Congress and the States shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag
of the United States." S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 88097 (daily ed.July
18, 1989). The proposal, by a vote of 51 to 48, failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds
majority in the Senate. 135 Cong. Rec. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989); see also Toner, Senate
Rejects Amendment Outlawing Flag Desecration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
11. The text of the Act reads in its entirety:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Flag Protection Act of 1989".
SEC. 2. CRIMINAL PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG.
(a) In General.-Subsection (a) of section 700 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"(a)(1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
"(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a
flag when it has become worn or soiled.".
(b) Definition.-Section 700(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'flag of the United States' means any flag of
the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a form
that is commonly displayed.".
SEC. 3. EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.
Section 700 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
"(d)(1) An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
from any interlocutory or finaljudgment, decree, or order issued by a United States
district court ruling upon the constitutionality of subsection (a).
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decision.' 2 President Bush did not veto the bill, however, he chose not to
sign it based on his opinion that a constitutional amendment was required
to circumvent Johnson.13 As this article went to press, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated the 1989 Act in consolidated appeals from two
recent challenges to it styled United States v. Eichman. 14
These two controversies were linked together by more than political
debate over manifestations of patriotism. Both, of course, implicated the
first amendment and in the process called upon the Supreme Court's

landmark decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.15

There, the Court held that the first amendment prohibited a state board of
education from requiring public school children to salute the flag while
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.16 Both the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in its advisory opinion to Governor Dukakis' 7 and the United States,
Supreme Court in its opinion in Johnson relied on Barnette.18 This is not
surprising. Not only was the Barnette holding pertinent to both issues, but
the classic nature of the opinion all but demands that it be invoked in any
controversy involving patriotic symbols and the first amendment.
Like Johnson, Barnette was a controversial case. It was litigated by
Jehovah's Witnesses, an unpopular religious minority group. 19 It was
decided while the nation was fighting World War II in both the Pacific and
Europe.20 It overruled a contrary decision handed down only three years
"(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question, accept
jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket and expedite to the greatest
extent possible.".
Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
12. A Senate Report accompanied the Act arguing that based on the testimony of several
witnesses who appeared before the Committee on the Judiciary, the Act was constitutional
because it was both content-neutral and designed to protect the physical integrity of the flag
rather than punish communication of ideas. S. Rep. No. 152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-15,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 610, 618-24.
13. See Dowd, President Hints at a Compromise Over Federal Funds for Abortion, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
14. 58 U.S.L.W. 4744 (June 11, 1990). Federal district courts in the Western District of
Washington and the District of Columbia had held that Act unconstitutional in the course of
criminal prosecutions arising out of flag burning incidents. United States v. Haggerty, 731 F.
Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990).
The Supreme Court held that the Act violated the first amendment because it was not content
neutral; rather it punished acts of flag desecration which disparaged the flag as a national
symbol, but protected respectful burning of a worn flag which promoted the flag's traditional
symbolic role. 58 U.S.L.W. at 4745-46.
Not surprisingly, the movement for a constitutional amendment was revived. Holmes,
House Flag Burning Amendment Advances on Subcomittee Vote, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1990,
A13, col. 1.
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The proposed amendment failed to gain enough votes in the
House, and now appears to be dead. Holmes, Amendment to Bar Flag Desecration Fails in the
House, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, Al, col. 3.
16. Id. at 642.
17. See 372 Mass. 874, 878-79, 363 N.E.2d 251, 254 (1977).
18. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537, 2539, 2545, 2547.
19. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628.
20. The nature of the required salute was changed after several groups protested that it
was too similar to the Nazi Sieg Heil salute. Id. at 627-28. The decision was handed down a few
months after the battles of Guadalcanal in the Pacific and Kaserine Pass in North Africa. See
J. Garraty, The American Nation: A History of the United States 769-72 (1975).
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earlier.2 t Most importantly, it concluded that the first amendment restricted the state's power to coerce respect for national symbols.

22

Despite

some of the similarities, the opinion of the Court in Barnette is very different
from the opinion in Johnson. The nature of those differences suggests ways
in which the Court's rhetoric and perhaps its own perception of its role have
shifted over the past forty years. These changes have not necessarily been
for the better.
Barnette is widely regarded as one of the Supreme Court's most
impressive first amendment decisions. This is not because of the facts of the
case, which are dealt with rather summarily near the beginning of the
opinion.23 Nor is it necessarily because of the nationwide impact of the
decision. Although Barnette removed the element of legal coercion from the
schools, it is likely that many children who did not share the Jehovah's
Witnesses' objection continued to pledge allegiance to the flag, implicitly
influenced at least by peer group pressure and unaware that the ritual was
not mandatory.2 4 Barnette is regarded as a great case in large part because
of the broad principle of freedom of conscience that the Court expounded.
It, however, also is considered a landmark case because of its rhetoric.
The Court in Barnette focused on the state's attempt to foster national
unity in light of first amendment protection for freedom of belief. All four
of the Justices who wrote in Barnette seemed to recognize that they were
talking to the American people about matters for which they cared very
deeply. For Supreme Court opinions, they are largely devoid of legalisms.
They are written in a straightforward, easily comprehensible, and frequently moving style.
Justice Jackson wrote the classic opinion of the Court. After briefly
describing the regulation and its application to the student plaintiffs, he
explained that the flag was a symbol and that the state was attempting to
require the individual to affirm a belief in the ideas that the flag
symbolized. 25 It was the question of whether the state possessed any such
21. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599-600 (1940) (holding that religious

beliefs could not excuse individuals from reciting Pledge of Allegiance). Gobitis was criticized
harshly in the law reviews and by some of the press. D. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The
Flag-Salute Controversy 158-60 (1962). A significant wave of persecution of Jehovah's
Witnesses broke out between the decisions in Gobitis and Barnette. Id. at 163-86.
22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
23. Id. at 625-30. The West Virginia State Board of Education had adopted a regulation
requiring all teachers and students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance while saluting the flag in
response to a state statute mandating that local school boards adopt courses of instruction" 'for
the purpose of teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of
Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the organization and machinery of the
government.'" Id. at 625 (quoting W. Va. Code § 1734 (Supp. 1941)).
24. As a student in a public elementary school during the fifties, I said the Pledge of
Allegiance with my class every morning. No one ever suggested that I had a right to abstain
and it certainly never occurred to me that I did or that there existed a Supreme Court case
named West Virginia State Board of Educationv. Barnette.
25. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632. Justice Jackson stated:
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of
utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The
use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality,
is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and
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power that Justice Jackson considered crucial to the proper resolution of
the case. 26 Noting that the Court's prior decision in Minersville School District

v. Gobitis27 assumed the existence of such power, he turned to an analysis of

that case. 28 In relatively short order, Justice Jackson rejected Justice
Frankfurter's arguments in Gobitis that invalidation of the regulation would
unduly weaken the government, transform the Court into a national school
board, and extend it well beyond its competence. 29 At that point, Justice
Jackson recognized that "the very heart of the Gobitis opinion," and of
course the heart of his Barnette opinion as well, was concerned with whether
the state has the power to use methods such as a compulsory flag salute to
foster national unity in furtherance of national security. 30 He then wrote
nine paragraphs that essentially decided the case and gave the opinion its
deservedly exalted status. In this closing section of the opinion he cited only
one case, in a footnote
at that, for a proposition that did not particularly
31
need any authority.
Justice Jackson relied on several historical examples to illustrate that
official, efforts to coerce national unity inevitably have proved futile and
divisive.3 2 As he summarized it, "Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems trite but necessary to
say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid
these ends by avoiding these beginnings." 33 Nazi Germany obviously was
fresh in mind. Justice Jackson continued with a reminder that under our
system public opinion controls authority and not the reverse. Recognizing
the inevitability of and indeed the need for diversity of opinion and belief
under the first amendment, Justice Jackson concluded that:
freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a

color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns
and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the
Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey
political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated
with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of acceptance or respect: a
salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee. A person gets from a symbol the
meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's
jest and scorn.
Id. at 632-33.
26. Id. at 634-36.
27. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-36.
29. Id. at 636-40.
30. Id. at 640.
31. Id. at 642 n.19. Justice Jackson cited the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1918), for the proposition that the government has the right to draft persons into the military.
32. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. Justice Jackson referred to Roman persecution of the
Christians, the Inquisition, and Siberian exile from Russia.
33. Id.
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orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion 4or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
3
therein.
These are unquestionably among the most powerful and most often quoted
paragraphs ever written by a United States Supreme Court Justice.
Justices Black and Douglas wrote a short concurring opinion explaining why they were voting to overrule the Gobitis decision that they had
joined in two years earlier.3 5 Their opinion was straightforward and simple,
citing only one other case.3 6 They explained that "[w]ords uttered under
coercion are proof of loyalty to nothing but self interest. Love of country
must spring from willing hearts and free minds, inspired by a fair
administration of wise laws enacted by the people's elected'37representatives
within the bounds of express constitutional prohibitions.
Justice Murphy also wrote a short concurring opinion. He quoted
from Thomas Jefferson, but did not cite any cases.3 8 He emphasized the
extent to which the West Virginia requirement was inconsistent with
freedom of religious belief and freedom of conscience3 9
Justice Frankfurter wrote an impassioned dissent defending his opinion for the Court in Gobitis by beginning with the now famous sentence,
"One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is
not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitution." 40 He devoted much of his lengthy dissent to an exposition of
his belief in the wisdom of judicial restraint, especially with respect to an
issue on which the Court already had spoken. 41 Although Justice Frankfurter called on Marshall, Jefferson, Lincoln, Holmes, Thayer, and others
for support, his argument ultimately was more one of policy than of
authority. 42 Closer to the merits, Justice Frankfurter argued that "[t]he
constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did
not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its
essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma." 43 Justice Frankfurter relied
on traditional case analysis to a much greater degree than the other Justices
44
who wrote in Barnette, although perhaps not as much as he ordinarily did.
34. Id. at 642.
35. Id. at 643-44 (Black, J., & Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 643 (Black, J., &Douglas, J., concurring) (citingJones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584,
623 (1942)).
37. Id. at 644 (Black, J., & Douglas, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 644-46 (Murphy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 648-53, 665-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 649, 653, 667-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. Compare id. at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 593-628 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 25-39
(1949). As a general rule, Justice Frankfurter did not write for the layperson. See generally H.
Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar on the Bench 343-50 (1960) (discussing Frankfurter's
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Barnette is a remarkable case. Perhaps it comes as close to law-asliterature as we can expect from the Supreme Court. 45 Intuitively, the result
in Barnette may not have been popular with large segments of the American
public. The opinions were written, however, in language apparently aimed
at explaining, as well as persuading the public at large and not simply
constitutional lawyers, that the Court had reached the right decision under
46
the first amendment.
From a technical legal standpoint, the style of the Barnette opinion can
cause problems. Justice Jackson recognized and relied on a rather sweeping
first amendment based "freedom of conscience" 47 that carries great rhetorical force but has yet to be clearly defined forty-five years later. As Justice
Frankfurter illustrated, it was hardly an example of restrained and cautious
48
judging.
As a matter ofjudicial style, Texas v. Johnson49 is a very different kind
of case from Barnette. The subject matter, flag burning, unquestionably
provokes a more intense reaction than a mandatory flag salute. Johnson
involved a situation somewhat the reverse of Barnette. In Barnette the
question was whether the state could require a specific act of respect toward
a national symbol. In Johnson the issue was whether the state could prohibit
a specific act of disrespect.
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority of a narrowly divided Court.
The opinion was low key and tightly structured. After stating the facts, he
considered whether Johnson's act of burning the flag was expressive in
nature and concluded that it was. 5 0 Justice Brennan set forth the Court's
analytical approach to the issue in the quotation below, which explicates the
Court's earlier decision in United States v. O'Brien51 and provides a representative example of the rhetorical style of the opinion. He stated:
Thus, although we have recognized that where " 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
writing style, work habits, and courtroom presence).

45. For recent discussions of the Barnette case from a literary perspective, see Ferguson,
The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J.L. & Humanities 201 (1990); Resnik,
Constructing the Canon, 2 Yale J.L. & Humanities 221 (1990).
46. See generally Prentice, Supreme Court Rhetoric, 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 85 (1983) (noting

persuasive strategies employed by Supreme Court Justices when writing opinions in controversial cases). Professor Prentice argues that the Supreme Court consciously needs to adopt

rhetorical strategies to persuade its various audiences, including the public, that its decisions
are correct. He points out that the Court often must speak to several different audiences at
once, including members of the Court itself, the litigants, government officials charged with
enforcement and obedience, other persons affected by the decision, the lower courts, the
press, and the public. Id. at 95-98. This obviously complicates the Court's task.
47. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
48. Id. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
50. Id. at 2548. Justice Brennan also wrote the majority opinion in the recent case of United
States v. Eichman, in which he relied on his Johnson opinion to strike down the federal Flag
Protection Act of 1989. If anything the Eichman opinion was even tighter and more measured
thanJohnson. 58 U.S.L.W. 4744 (June 11, 1990) The Court refused to reconsiderJohnson. Id.
at 4746.
51. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms," O'Brien, supra, at 376... we have limited
the applicability of O'Brien's relatively lenient standard to those
cases in which "the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." Id., at 377 ... see also Spence, 418
U.S., at 414, n.8.... In stating, moreover, that O'Brien's test "in
the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied
to time, place, or manner restrictions," Clark, supra, at 298 ... we
have highlighted the requirement that the governmental interest
in question be unconnected to expression in order to come under
52
O'Brien's.less demanding rule.
Justice Brennan then analyzed the asserted state interests. He concluded that the state interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not
implicated by the facts in the record. 53 Most of the Court's analysis was
devoted to the other asserted state interest, i.e., "preserving the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity." 54 Because intent to offend the
public was an element of the offense, the Court concluded that the
restriction was related to the defendant's
message and consequently, the
55
strict standard of review applied.
Quoting Justice Jackson's famous "fixed star" language from Barnette,
the Court stated that there was no special first amendment exception for
the American flag nor any way to distinguish it from other national symbols
such as the presidential seal or the Constitution. 56 Consequently, Texas'.
legitimate interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity could
not override the first amendment policy against content-based restrictions
on expression. 57 Up to that point, the Court's opinion had been measured
and lawyerly with frequent citation and analysis of the precedents; quotations from the briefs, record, and transcript of oral argument; and
discussion and application of the Court's pertinent analytical tests. 58 Justice
Brennan closed the opinion, however, by explaining:
We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly
cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not
weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation
of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best
reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such
as Johnson's is a sign and source of our strength. Indeed, one of
52. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540-41. This short passage, with its multitudinous citations and

quotations, is a microcosm of Brennan's opinion as a whole.

53. Id. at 2541-42.
54. Id. at 2542-48.
55. Id. at 2543. Again in Eichman, the Court concluded that the lack of content neutrality
was the undoing of the statute. The Court noted that the Act's prohibition of conduct that
"knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains on the floor or ground, or
tramples upon any flag" is aimed at "disrespectful treatment." Similarly the exception for
ceremonious burning of a worn flag protects respectful treatment. This indicated a concern
with the viewpoint of the symbolic expression rather than a neutral attempt at preserving the
physical integrity of the flag. 58 U.S.L.W. at 4745.

56. Johnson at 2545-46.
57. Id. at 2546.
58. Id. at 2536-46.
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the proudest images of our flag, the one immortalized in our own
national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at Fort
McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas
sees reflected in the flag-and it is that resilience that we reassert
today.
The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those
who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them
that they are wrong.5 9
Following a quotation from Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California,6 ° the Court closed by noting:
And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one's
response to the flag-burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive
power of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate
response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better way
to counter a flag-burner's message than by saluting the flag that
burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag
burned than by-as one witness here did-according its remains a
respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its
desecration, for in doing so6 1we dilute the freedom that this
cherished emblem represents.
Justice Kennedy added a short concurring opinion in which he did not
really address the first amendment issue. Rather, he simply explained that
while he found the decision to be very painful, he believed
that it was
62
correct and that the Court could not avoid such hard cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the primary dissent. He devoted the
first portion of his opinion to several lyrical quotations pertaining to the
flag including the Star Spangled Banner,Emerson's Concord Hymn, and all of

Whittier's poem BarbaraFrietchie.6 3 The Chief Justice continued by quoting
from federal law and precedent to illustrate the reverence with which the
American flag is held.6 4 Turning to the legal issues, Chief Justice Rehnquist

argued that, as with fighting words, burning the flag, even though
59. Id. at 2547.
60. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
61. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48. Justice Brennan closed his opinion in United States v.
Eichman by making a similar point, but far more succinctly and with greater moderation than
in Johnson. Essentially he wrote:
We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many. But the same
might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets .... vulgar
repudiations of the draft.., and scurrilous caricatures .... "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that Government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." [quoting Johnson] Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very
freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.
58 U.S.L.W. 4744, 4746 (June 11, 1990) (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 2549-50 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). See Massey, The Jurisprudence of Poetic
License, 1989 Duke L.J. 1047, 1048-50 (1989), for the observation that the BarbaraFrietchie
story was a creation of Whittier's imagination and that ChiefJustice Rehnquist should not have
treated it as historical fact.
64. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2550-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

426
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expressive in nature, is " 'no essential part of any exposition of
ideas .... , ',65 He argued that criminal punishment of flag burning should
not run afoul of the first amendment since there are so many other ways in
which the speaker can convey his message, including the burning of every
other national symbol. 66 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
prohibition was not aimed at the message at all, but rather, the mode in
67
which it was conveyed.
Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion.68 Like Chief Justice
Rehnquist, he attempted to capture the special significance that the
American flag bears to citizens and noncitizens as well. He wrote:
It is more than a proud symbol of the courage, the determination,
and the gifts of nature that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into
a world power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of
religious tolerance, and of goodwill for other peoples who share
our aspirations. The symbol carries its message to dissidents both
at home and abroad who69 may have no interest at all in our
national unity or survival.
Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens argued that criminal prohibition was aimed at the manner of communication rather than the content
of the message
and as such was not as troubling under the first
70
amendment.
Despite the controversy that it produced, the Court's opinion in
Johnson probably reached the correct result as a matter of first amendment
doctrine. 7 1 Punishing a person specifically because her expression offends
others runs directly counter to one of the central tenets of freedom of
speech. 72 The dissent was not wholly correct in characterizing the prohibition as simply one of manner rather than content. The message is not
simply "I disagree with what the flag represents"; it is also inevitably "I have
no respect for the flag." As such, there is probably not any other equally
effective manner of conveying the message. Moreover, the state does not
have unlimited authority to prohibit one method of expression simply
65. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
66. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Edisode: An Essay on
the Constitution, 61 Colo. L. Rev. 39, 44-46 (1990), for the argument that Chief Justice
Rehnquist may have failed to build a majority in Johnson by making the rhetorical error of
suggesting that the Court should modify general first amendment principles instead of simply
making an exception for flag burning.
67. Johnson at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2555-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the sole dissent in United
States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744, 4746 (June 11, 1990), writing for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and White, the Johnson dissenters.
70. Johnson at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reiterated this theme in his
dissent in Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4746-47.
71. See Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 111, 114 (1989)
(concluding that Supreme Court's analysis in Johnson was correct). The same is true ofJustice
Brennan's majority opinion in Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4744-46.
72. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544. Justice Brennan cited 13 Supreme Court precedents for
this proposition. Justice Harlan made the point particularly well for the Court in Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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because another is available, especially when the prohibition may affect the
nature of the message conveyed.7 3 The dissent is surely correct in noting
that the flag is unique and more special than any other national symbol.
Even so, there is little in existing first amendment doctrine to suggest that
even the flag
may be placed off limits to offensive and destructive symbolic
74
expression.
From a purely doctrinal standpoint, Justice Brennan did a creditable
job of explaining why the conviction could not be sustained. In other
respects, however, the opinion is disappointing. Unlike the concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy or the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
only dimly acknowledges how painful and wrenching the burning of the
American flag is for most Americans.
Because of the sensitive nature of the public issue involved, Johnson is
the type of case in which the Court should consider itself under an
obligation to speak directly to the people and attempt to explain in
nontechnical language why it believes it must reach the result that it has.
The Barnette opinion certainly can be read as one in which the Court
recognized and discharged that obligation in a powerful and effective
manner. 75 In making his primary constitutional argument in that case,
Justice Jackson wrote eloquently but in the language of the layperson
rather than the lawyer.
The core of his opinion is wholly uncluttered with
citations or jargon. 76
In contrast, most of Justice Brennan's opinion in Johnson, especially
the core explanation of why the conviction was unconstitutional, is relatively technical and packed with citations to and quotations from legal
authority. 77 Like most Supreme Court opinions, it clearly is addressed to an
audience of lawyers and scholars as opposed to the public at large. This is
quite unfortunate. Much of the strength and legitimacy of the Constitution
73. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980)
(rejecting suggestion that content-based regulation justified by showing alternative means of
speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 n.15 (1976) (same); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556
(1975) (same); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (same).
74. To a large extent, this is the gist of Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in Barnette.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; see also M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of
Speech § 3.06[E][1] (1984) (noting that flag desecration statutes probably violate first
amendment ); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1502-08 (1975) (same).
75. See Mengler, Public Relations in the Supreme Court: Justice Tom Clark's Opinion in
the School Prayer Case, 6 Const. Commentary 331 (1989), for the argument thatJustice Tom
Clark made a very deliberate attempt to deflect adverse reaction by writing an opinion
addressed directly to the American people in the Court's second school prayer case, School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
76. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-42.
77. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-48. But see Greenwalt, O'er the Land of the Free: Flag
Burning as Speech, 37 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 925, 943 (1990) (noting that none of the Justices in
Johnson, includingJustice Brennan, cited a single law review articleperhaps to avoid detracting
"from the majestic simplicity of the flag and the majestic simplicity of freedom of speech").
Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority in United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744, is
still legalistic, but is perhaps somewhat more accessible and considerably shorter than his
opinion in Johnson.
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itself is derived from the fact that it was ratified by the people and that the
people continue to accept its legal and moral authority. 78 Most of the time,
the vast majority of the people would probably just as well remain ignorant
of how the Court is interpreting the Constitution. But sometimes they want
to understand. And when they do, the Court has an obligation to explain in
a comprehensible manner, especially when its decision almost certainly
runs against common intuition. In a case like Johnson, the Court truly
should feel a responsibility to act as a "teacher[7]9in a vital national seminar,"
to use Professor Rostow's memorable phrase.
Arguably, Justice Brennan attempted to explain the decision in
layperson's terms in the final few paragraphs of his opinion.8 0 Unfortunately, that portion of the opinion seems hollow and preachy. Rather than
explaining why the first amendment mandates the result reached by the
Court, Justice Brennan basically told those who favor the punishment of
flag burning that their response is inconsistent with true American values.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent:
The Court concludes its opinion with a regrettably patronizing
civics lecture, presumably addressed to the Members of both
Houses of Congress, the members of the 48 state legislatures that
enacted prohibitions against flag burning, and the troops fighting
under that flag in Vietnam who objected to its being burned ....
The Court's role as the final expositor of the Constitution is well
established, but its role as a platonic guardian admonishing those
responsible to public opinion as if they were truant school
81
children has no similar place in our system of government.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's characterization of the tone of Justice Brennan's
remarks rings true. And he is certainly correct that the Court would be ill
advised to resort to scolding those who disagree in good faith. That does not
mean, however, that the Court should avoid any attempt to explain its more
controversial decisions to the public at large. If that is what Justice Brennan
was trying to do, then he simply did a poor job of it.
It would seem that each of the other Justices who wrote in Johnson
made some attempt to speak to an audience beyond the immediate
professional consumers of the Court's product. In a sense, Justice Kennedy
simply apologized. In essence, he said, "I realize that what I have done will
hurt you, I'm sorry, but I really had to do it." The thought was nice. It was
better than nothing. But perhaps he should have tried to explain in simple
terms why the first amendment requires that result.
78. See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 15-16 (1975) (noting that consent of public
depends on keeping public informed on issues); C. Black, The People and the Court: Judicial
Review in a Democracy 209-15 (1960) (stating conviction in the "necessity and the duty of
ultimate deference to the people, in the exercise of all political power"); Rostow, The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 210 (1952) (describing Court's
duty as one of preserving "democratic legitimacy of political decisions").
79. Rostow, supra note 78, at 208.
80. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48; see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
81. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As noted above, Justice
Brennan largely avoided this tack in Eichman. See supra note 61.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to evoke the spirit of reverence that
Americans feel toward the flag by calling upon both literature and the law.
He was able to drive home the point that the flag is indeed perceived
differently than any other national symbol. His analysis of the first
amendment issue, however, was as technical and citation-laden as Justice
Brennan's analysis.8 2 Justice Stevens' short dissent, more than any of the
other opinions in the case, attempted to explain in ordinary language the
and the reasons why the state should be able
special significance of the flag
83
to prohibit its desecration.
Perhaps Justice Brennan was attempting to explain the decision in a
more popular idiom near the end of his decision and simply did so
inartfully. If so, it would be unfair to criticize him for lacking the eloquence
of a Justice Jackson. Johnson is scarcely the only recent Supreme Court
opinion involving a significant constitutional issue that seems more technical than evocative.8 4 Virtually all of the Court's opinions seem bland and'
plodding these days. Perhaps the presentJustices, despite their competence
and intelligence, simply do not have the literary talents that contributed to
the greatness of the likes of Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Jackson, Douglas,
Black, Frankfurter, and both Harlans, just to name a few. In that regard,
perhaps we have been particularly fortunate in the past.
There is, however, probably more to the contrast between Barnette and
Johnson than the stylistic strengths of different generations of Justices. It is,
rather, a classic example of what Professor Robert Nagel has characterized
as the "formulaic constitution."8 5 In his extraordinarily perceptive article of
a few years back, Professor Nagel argued that the Supreme Court has
adopted a highly formalistic style of opinion writing over the past thirty

82. Johnson at 2552-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2555-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying
text. Once again, Justice Stevens' dissent in Eichman was written in a style far more accessible
to the layperson than was Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority. Indeed, it contains no
footnotes and only one formal legal citation-to Texas v. Johnson. The analysis is engaging
and at times quite eloquent despite the fact Justice Brennan's position on the merits is far
stronger.
From a rhetorical standpoint, Justice Stevens' dissent in Eichman comes close to achieving
what Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Johnson so sorely lacked. For instance, he writes:
The symbolic value of the American flag is not the same today as it was yesterday.
Events during the last three decades have altered the country's image in the eyes of
numerous Americans, and some now have difficulty understanding the message that
the flag conveyed to their parents and grandparents-whether born abroad and
naturalized or native born. Moreover, the integrity of the symbol has been compromised by those leaders who seem to advocate compulsory worship of the flag even by
individuals whom it offends, or who seem to manipulate the symbol of national
purpose into a pretext for partisan disputes about meaner ends. And, as I have

suggested, the residual value of the symbol after this court's decision in Texas v.
Johnson is surely not the same as it was a year ago.
58 U.S.L.W. at 4747.

84. See generally Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985)
(discussing how Supreme Court's modem constitutional jurisprudence is distancing itself from
the public and the Constitution).
85. Id. at 165.
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years.8 6 As he explained:
This style emphasizes formalized doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of "tests" or "prongs" or "requirements" or
"standards" or "hurdles." The judicial opinions in which*these
"analytical devices" appear tend to be characterized by tireless,
detailed debate among the Justices. The apparently definitive
formulations, standing amidst a welter of separate opinions and
contentious footnotes,8 7seem forlorn testaments to the ideals of
clarity and consensus.
. . . The style is an amalgam of the bureaucratic and the
academic. 88
• . . The Court... has adopted the formulaic style in part
because its primary audience is not the general public. It is
addressing itself, its clerks, and the lower courts.
. . . It is also academic. The opinions look like law review
pattern of laborious footnoting and
articles. They have the same
89
detailed argumentation.
. . . In this age of intellectual anxiety, when judicial power is
extended but its bases are more problematic than ever, it is only
natural that the Court should imitate its most skeptical and
demanding audience.9 0
. . . [T]he modern style is a superficial and unsatisfactory
response to (admittedly) serious problems. It achieves organizational control and intellectual responsibility, to the extent it does
so, by excluding the general public from the Court's audience and
by impoverishing the Court's thought.9 1
Professor Nagel's analysis accurately captures the feel of modern
Supreme Court opinions and explains why they rarely, if ever, are capable
of rising to the heights of a Barnette. Arguably, the Court does not speak to
the public persuasively, if at all, to a large degree because it has gotten out
of the habit of engaging in ordinary discourse. As Professor Nagel put it,
"the current Court [has] persistently ...isolate[d] itself from the general
culture, retaining ties of language and intellectual approach only to an
86. Id.; see also Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. Legal
Educ. 313, 315 (1989) ("Opinions that are shorn of adornments-the crisp, plain statements
of an earlier day-do not seem 'scholarly' or 'reasoned' when written today. The principle
appears to be that if an opinion is short, unanimous, and readable, it is unsophisticated or

unimportant; if not, it is positively brilliant.").
87. Nagel, supra note 84, at 165 (footnotes omitted).
88. Id. at 177.
89. Id. at 178.
90. Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 182.
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academic elite. '92 By so doing, it sacrifices the opportunity to exert any
significant, direct influence on popular understanding of the Constitution.
This in turn tends to weaken the bond between the people and the Court.
Given that the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review is based largely on
consent of the governed, such consent is undermined when the Court
declines to speak to the people in their own language.
This is not to suggest that a straightforward and even eloquent opinion
will change many minds on a controversial issue, at least in the short run.
Most Americans will not read Supreme Court opinions or even newspaper
excerpts of them no matter how they are written or to whom they are
addressed. 93 There certainly must have been many who read Justice
Jackson's opinion in Barnette and yet continued to believe that the first
amendment should not be construed to prohibit the mandatory flag
salute. 94 Many, perhaps even a majority, would still agree. Similarly, it is
unlikely that the most persuasive and evocative opinion that the Supreme
Court could have written would have convinced many of those who so
vigorously disagreed that the criminal prohibition of flag burning in the
circumstances of Johnson should be unconstitutional. But that is not
necessarily the point. It is important, at least in cases such as Johnson, that
the Court attempts to explain its decision to the people at large simply out
of respect. If for no other reason than to reinforce its own legitimacy, the
Court should say "we understand that many of you disagree but here is why
we so hold." To a degree, Justice Kennedy attempted to make that effort.
Justice Brennan also appeared to make such an effort but only as an
afterthought and in a voice that seemed more patronizing than empathetic.
Contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion, the unconvincing tone of
92. Id. at 212. Professor Mengler wrote that "[tlwenty-five years later, one is hard pressed
to name any other Supreme Court opinion decided since Schempp that has attempted to
address the concerns of the American people." Mengler, supra note 75, at 348. See also
Schauer, Opinions as Rules (Book Review), 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 682, 687-88 (1986) (observing
that Supreme Court rarely writes opinions for its nonacademic audience, especially the
ordinary citizen).
93. See Mengler, supra note 75, at 347. Mengler noted that reaction to the Supreme
Court's first two school prayer cases, including the Schempp opinion which was arguably aimed
directly at the public, occurred before the public had the time or opportunity to read the
opinions. Id. at 346-47. Even if the "man on the street" does not read the opinions, the Court
should at least write in language that allows gatekeepers to explain decisions to the public.
Prentice, supra note 46, at 97. Much can be lost in translation, of course. David Manwaring
notes that many writers in both the popular press and the law reviews misinterpreted the
Jackson opinion in Barnette as a freedom of religion, rather than a freedom of conscience
decision. D. Manwaring, supra note 21, at 236, 239.
94. In his study of Gobitis and Barnette, Manwaring concluded that the reaction of the press
to Barnette was largely favorable, persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses subsided following the
decision, and the public at large was too caught up in the war effort to engage in any
significant negative reaction to the decision. D. Manwaring, supra note 21, at 236-40. There
was a certain amount of state defiance of the Barnette decision, however, particularly in New
Jersey and Colorado. Id. at 242.
In his study of the Schempp opinion, Professor Mengler concluded that the direct and simple
nature of the opinion was not the reason why the public reaction to the decision was milder
than to the previous school prayer decision. Rather, the public had grown accustomed to the
Court's interference with school prayer. Mengler noted, however, that Judge Kaufman had
previously reached the opposite conclusion. See Mengler, supra note 75, at 334, 346-49 (citing
Kaufman, The Supreme Court and its Critics, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1963, at 50).
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Justice Brennan's final remarks should not persuade future Courts to stick
to their dry and technical formulaic analysis in cases like Johnson. Rather, it
should push them to try even harder in the course of their analysis of
difficult and publicly controversial constitutional cases to make a rhetorical
connection with the people. Obviously that will not be easy. As Professor
Nagel noted, "if [the Court's] roles require sensitive moral judgments and
the capacity to educate and move the people who provide continuing
consent to the authority of the Constitution, the Court must learn other
ways of talking. It could learn something from reconsidering the. idioms of
past Courts." 95 West Virginia State Board of Educationv. Barnette would be an
excellent place to start.

95. Nagel, supra note 84, at 212.

